What we already know about Israel’s ‘secret’ nuclear program

Israel’s nuclear policy is based on the vague declaration that it will “not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons to the Middle East.” Israel has also refused to sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) despite international pressure to do so.

The issue of Israel’s nuclear capability has resurfaced recently amid escalating tensions in the region. Israel’s Heritage Minister Amichai Eliyahu, a member of the far-right Otzma Yehudit (Jewish Power) party, sparked controversy when he suggested that using nuclear weapons against Gaza was an option. He was later suspended from his post.

Following the suspension, the leader of the United Nations’ nuclear regulatory agency cautioned against careless discussions about the use of catastrophic weapons.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan also raised the issue of Israel’s nuclear arsenal, calling for it to be put on the global agenda. He accused Western countries of supporting and ignoring Israel’s alleged atrocities in Gaza, where Israeli airstrikes have killed more than 14,000 people.

How did Israel acquire nuclear weapons?

Israel’s nuclear program dates back to the early years of its statehood, when its first Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion, was determined to obtain nuclear weapons as a deterrent against another Holocaust.

In 1949, a unit of the Israeli army’s science corps, HEMED GIMMEL, began a geological survey in the Naqab (Negev) desert, looking for oil and uranium deposits essential for nuclear development.

In the same year, Israel started sending nuclear physics students abroad, where they learned about atomic chain reactions and other aspects of nuclear science.

By 1952, Israel Atomic Energy Commission chief Ernst David Bergmann sought nuclear cooperation with France and established the basis for a long-term French-Israeli collaboration. This partnership involved Israeli scientists working in French nuclear facilities and exchanging information, especially with those who had worked on the Manhattan Project.

The cooperation peaked in 1957, when France agreed to build a nuclear reactor and a reprocessing plant in Israel, a decision motivated by geopolitical and scientific interests.

The cooperation was secured through secret agreements, which ostensibly focused on peaceful uses of nuclear energy but also had implications for weapons development.

However, the cooperation faced obstacles when Charles de Gaulle became president of France and ended French assistance to Israel by 1966.

Israel also faced challenges from the US, especially under President John F. Kennedy, who was concerned about Israel’s nuclear ambitions and demanded inspections of its reactor. Despite these pressures, Israel managed to keep its nuclear program secret and avoid international scrutiny.

Israel also received covert help from Britain and Norway, who supplied it with restricted materials and heavy water vital for reactor operations.

The Dimona reactor became operational in 1962, and by 1966, Israel had reportedly produced its first nuclear weapon, marking the start of its full-scale atomic weapons production.

The exact costs of Israel’s nuclear program are unknown, but it is believed that it relied heavily on foreign aid and Mossad’s secret operations.

What are the implications of Israel’s nuclear status?

Israel’s nuclear status has been a source of controversy and speculation for decades, especially after the dramatic revelations of Israeli defector Mordechai Vanunu in 1986. Vanunu, a former technician at the Dimona reactor, exposed the extent of Israel’s nuclear program to the British media and was subsequently kidnapped by Mossad agents and brought back to Israel, where he spent 18 years in prison, mostly in solitary confinement.

By the mid-2000s, estimates of Israel’s nuclear arsenal varied widely, with some sources suggesting that Israel had uranium enrichment capabilities, adding to the uncertainties.

Despite occasional statements by other countries expressing concern about Israel’s nuclear capabilities, there has been little pressure on Israel to declare its nuclear activities or open up its facilities for inspection, let alone to destroy its weapons.

There are significant differences in how the international community addresses the issue of nuclear proliferation, particularly when considering Israel, Iran, and Pakistan. Israel is believed to have nuclear weapons but has never officially acknowledged it and benefits from a position of strategic ambiguity.

As a result, Israel is not subject to the same level of scrutiny or sanctions as other countries.

In contrast, Iran, whose nuclear program has raised global concerns about potential weaponization, has been subject to rigorous inspections, strict sanctions, and intense diplomatic negotiations under frameworks like the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). 

Given Pakistan’s decision to carry out nuclear tests in 1998, it is frequently analyzed in the context of regional security dynamics, especially in relation to its rivalry with India. As a result, it is subject to a unique set of international concerns and regulatory protocols.

The nuclear policy of Israel is viewed as both a deterrent against its adversaries and a probable hazard to regional and global stability. The absence of transparency and accountability regarding Israel’s nuclear program creates obstacles for international endeavors to prevent nuclear proliferation and encourage disarmament.